What is it about?
This paper seeks to identify possible metaphysical-qua-ontological sources of replication failures in psychological research. The main conjecture is that psychological phenomena are objectively probabilistic in nature. This probabilistic nature prevents high rates of replication even under ideal methodological conditions of experimental control, statistical analysis, and such.
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Why is it important?
The conjecture questions construing a high rate of replication failures in psychology as a ‘crisis.’ There are only phenomena that, by their objectively probabilistic nature, do not allow for as many replications as we wish or need. This way of thinking about replication failures in psychology is more realistic and fosters a more positive attitude towards them. They are as constitutive of psychological phenomena as are successes. Rather than lamenting replication failures, a defeatist attitude, it is more constructive and liberating to think of them as telling us something about what psychological phenomena really are. In this manner, replication efforts become vital.
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This page is a summary of: Getting ontologically serious about the replication crisis in psychology., Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, June 2024, American Psychological Association (APA),
DOI: 10.1037/teo0000281.
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