What is it about?

Metaphysics is a philosophical discipline that studies fundamental properties and relations of being. On the one hand, it is supposed to be as general as possible and, by this, it should go beyond the research of science, and continue to ask further questions about being at a point where scientists stopped already theorizing (that's one possible reading of "meta-physics"). On the other hand, it is science that reveals to us facts about the fundamental structure of nature, for which reason metaphysical study should be based on science and continuous with science. The paper outlines how metaphysical research can fulfil these requirements by adopting the inductive method of science.

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Why is it important?

Classical metaphysical approaches focus mainly on conceptual reasoning independent of empirical research. For this reason, these so-called "a priori approaches" (which means approaches that are independent of experience) fail the condition of being continuous with science. Modern approaches suggested naturalizing or dissolving metaphysical reasoning into the single scientific disciplines; that is, they suggested that there is no metaphysical reasoning over and above scientific reasoning. By this, such approaches face the problem of being not really approaches of "meta-"physics. Inductive metaphysics, as outlined in the paper, aims at getting the right balance between being continuous with science, and also exceeding scientific research regarding questions concerning the fundamental structure of reality.

Perspectives

Writing this article really helped to get an overview of different meta-metaphysical accounts, highlight their pros and cons, and see where inductive metaphysics innovatively pops in.

Dr. Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla
University of Cologne

Read the Original

This page is a summary of: Inductive Metaphysics, Grazer Philosophische Studien, January 2021, Brill,
DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000129.
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