What is it about?
Psychometrics is claimed to enable science-based quantifications of the human mind. This article shows that these claims are based on ambiguous meanings of key terms used in psychology that, moreover, are often confused with one another. It also highlights fundamental differences to measurement in the physical sciences and its key concepts. These are masked by frequent misconceptions about physical measurement in psychology. In addition, the epistemological foundations of psychometrics are elaborated only insufficiently elaborated and involve erroneous assumptions about analogies to measurement.
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Why is it important?
The analyses show that psychometrics does not establish systematic relations to individuals’ minds as needed for measurement and that, consequently, psychometric results should not be used to make decisions about persons.
Perspectives
This provocative article is aimed at stimulating much needed debate and discussion about established research practices in psychology and the widespread but erroneous beliefs that psychometrics could be similar to measurement.
Dr Jana Uher
University of Greenwich
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Psychometrics is not measurement: Unraveling a fundamental misconception in quantitative psychology and the complex network of its underlying fallacies., Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, February 2021, American Psychological Association (APA),
DOI: 10.1037/teo0000176.
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Author Homepage
Jana Uher has developed a novel transdisciplinary and philosophy-of-science paradigm focused on individuals, their personality, behaviours and social relationships.
Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals
The TPS-Paradigm provides philosophical, metatheoretical and methodological frameworks to explore the complexity of individuals and their lives from transdisciplinary viewpoints.
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