Trust in Science and Public Gullibility

What is it about?

The relevance of Karl R. Popper’s ideas for contemporary philosophy of science is examined in this chapter by considering whether they offer sufficiently strong reasons to offset the current proliferation of public distrust of science. One may argue that his critical rationalist view of science, understood as a cognitive regime which calls for bold theories and, at the same time, demands a rigorous and continuous methodological distrust towards them, is a compelling argument for the trustworthiness of scientific knowledge. It has become apparent, however, that science detractors are exploiting this very argument to undermine public confidence in science and science-based technologies. This fact raises doubts as to whether the critical rationalist conception of science is truly conducive to encouraging public trust in science.

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Why is it important?

I claim that in order to provide a more compelling argument, the critical rationalist philosophy needs to address a range of institutional, social and political issues involved in knowledge construction. This, however, poses before the critical rationalist philosophy of science an existential dilemma: on the one hand, its future relevance seems to depend on its ability to address successfully those issues which thus far have been deliberately left outside its theoretical scope, while, on the other, opening the critical rationalist philosophy to those very issues threatens to undermine the basic beliefs upon which Popper’s philosophy of science has been erected. Since leaving those vital issues unaddressed would consign Popper’s ideas to irrelevance, I suggest that critical rationalism cannot confine itself to problems of the logic of science and should expand its perspective to include the historical, social, and psychological context of the growth of science.

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