Husserl's argument from irreversibility against materialism

What is it about?

This paper reconstructs of one of Husserl’s anti-materialist arguments. Husserl hints at this argument in Ideas II & III where he exposes essential dif- ferences between mental and material reality. At its core, Husserl claims that mental entities by their very essence can never be in the same qualitative condition at different times. By sharp contrast, for purely material or physical entities such a cyclical development is not essentially excluded. This is called Husserl’s argument from irreversibility. I argue that this argument is modal in nature, and that it can be used to make a case against materialism based on the necessary supervenience of the mental on the physical. My primary goal is to elucidate this argument, and to offer a logical reconstruction using basic modal logic and contemporary notions of supervenience. I conclude that Husserl’s argument is formally valid, and that it can even held to be sound, although the premise regarding the necessary irreversibility of the mental requires further clarification.

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Why is it important?

Husserl's position vis-à-vis the mind-body problem is rarely examined. Therefore, it is important to look more closely at the relationship of his phenomenology to classical positions such as materialism (physicalism) or dualism. This paper analyses one of Husserl's arguments against materialism.

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