What is it about?

I dissect how Russia justified its interventions in Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014) and discover that it appealed to three types of responsibility - legal, international systemic, and identity-related. The first two justifications failed both in 2008 and 2014, but the third one clicked with its target audience and may, in fact, conditioned Russia's appeals to the other two.

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Why is it important?

It is important mostly for international audience that either keeps interpreting Russia's rhetoric in international-systemic and/or legal frames, or discards its excuses for intervention altogether, treating it as a smokescreen for hidden selfish motives. I suggest that it would be more useful to look at Russia's rhetoric as being symptomatic of Russia's identity crisis, and engage with it on such terms. Those identity problems stem from Russia's acute ontological insecurity and make its rhetoric on international responsibility defensive, self-centered, and even autistic. If the root of the problem is such, then a solution that could ensure long-lasting peace and security should be sought not in legal codes or universal principles, but in making sense of Russia's troubled identity narratives and acting upon them.

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This page is a summary of: Intervention as Virtue, Obligation and Moral Duty, Russian Politics, June 2017, Brill Deutschland GmbH,
DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00202003.
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