What is it about?
Until now, the concept of mentophobia (coined by Griffin) consisted of denying, wrongly and for the wrong reasons, the cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals. I show that this concept must also include the fact of despising their capacities which one does not deny.
Photo by Stijn te Strake on Unsplash
Why is it important?
This is important, because it makes it possible to empirically verify whether the acceptance of the new paradigm of animal consciousness can also accentuate a form of contempt for their less "high" capacities.
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This page is a summary of: A New Definition of Ethical Mentophobia, Society and Animals, July 2023, Brill, DOI: 10.1163/15685306-bja10132.
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