What is it about?
This paper shows that elections influence how policymakers respond to speculative pressure on their currencies. Especially when this pressure is strong enough for people to notice but not too strong, so that policymakers have an actual choice, policymakers defend the currency when faced with a currency crisis before an election – and tend to get rewarded by voters with reelection. They are most likely to devalue shortly after elections.
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Why is it important?
Helps us understand the politics of currency crises.
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: The limits and rewards of political opportunism: How electoral timing affects the outcome of currency crises, European Journal of Political Research, May 2009, Wiley,
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00837.x.
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