What is it about?

The Doomsday argument makes surprising and debatable claims from seemingly innocuous assumptions (not knowing when some physical process will end, assuming that we don't have a special place as observers, etc.). I review proposed solutions to this paradox, and show that none can be successful as long as we use a probability function to represent our ignorance and indifference. I explain how using imprecise probabilities can dissolve the Doomsday argument.

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Why is it important?

This work constitutes a defense of imprecise probabilities and shows their relevance to handle disputed inferences in science that rest on the Doomsday argument. It also shows the limit of usual probabilistic solutions to solving the Doomsday problem.

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This page is a summary of: Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles, Philosophy of Science, December 2015, University of Chicago Press,
DOI: 10.1086/683326.
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