What is it about?
The article is about UN targeted sanctions and their impact on non-state armed actors in Africa. It argues that sanctions that work well for the state actor may not translate well to the context of non state armed actors. For example, sanctions are based on assumptions such as 'winning coalition', regime types, and economic interdependence, which are basically statist. Given that the assumptions are inapplicable to non state armed actors, sanctions against the latter may not work well. The cases of the RUF in Sierra Leone and UNITA in Angola are used to test the argument.
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Why is it important?
The article is unique because it highlights a largely neglected issue in controversy over the effectiveness of UN sanctions and/or how to enhance their effectiveness. It argues that there is need to pay close attention to the peculiarities of the non state armed actor when designing sanctions against the latter. Sanctions based on statist concepts or assumptions may not work well against non state armed actors.
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This page is a summary of: Sanctions, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Coercing Non-State Armed Actors in Africa, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, January 2017, Taylor & Francis,
DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2017.1281679.
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