How railways were vital to both German and Soviet armies during the Second World War

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Railways provided almost all the heavy lift to run military operations and the economy on both sides during the Russo-German War and yet the studies into this area have been very limited and largely conducted during the period 1950 and 60s when historical studies in this conflict were constrained by political and social factors. Even the classic study by Schuler failed to make any comment on the Soviet railways, always accepting the premise that they were technologially inferior. Yet the work by the American economist Holland Hunter shows that the Soviet railways in the period 1932-1941 were one of the most efficient in the world second only to the US railways. The aim of this article was to reconcile these two viewpoints and explore the reasons behind the German failure to exploit the Soviet railways in a more efficient manner. In June 1944 Army Group Centre had to make the choice between transporting much needed reinforcements or vitally needed munitions, as there was insufficient railway capacity to transport both. This shows how 3 years of occupation and work by the Reichsbahn had failed to equip the Wehrmacht with the railways that they needed behind the front. The Battles for Moscow and Stalingrad had both been hamstrung by logistical problems that stemmed in large part from problems with the railways, while the slow build up for Kursk was due to the same reason, yet the Soviets managed to launch offensive after offensive over railways that had just been destroyed by the retreating Ostheer. Railways are a vital factor in the study of military operations during the war and they should be at the centre of any historical assessment.

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