What is it about?
After the 2011–2012 electoral protest cycles, the opportunity structures for a broad range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been narrowed. This essay argues that increased control over NGOs mirrors a deeper conflict of governance models, which is endogenous to the Russian political system, between bureaucratic modernisation and patronal politics. The modernisation sought by the Kremlin under Medvedev’s term brought a greater demand for organisations capable of fulfilling the dual purpose of public communication and state advisory functions. This required clear legal definitions, areas of competence and rules of conduct. However, patronal politics dictate that NGOs should bow to the state, and be governed by diffuse principles of loyalty.
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Why is it important?
The article scrutinises the sources and consequences of a large set of legal amendments that have gained in public salience, such as the Law on Foreign Agents and the Law on Undesirable Organisations. These laws, and other restrictions, are central devises in the regime's dismantling of the civil society gains that materialised from 2008 to 2012. The article uses new empirical material, draws on numerous Russian-Language sources, and engages with new theories of regime evolution.
Perspectives
As the set of laws are being amended further, I find the work to be of wider importance, possibly beyond 2018 as well. The laws contain the development of Russian civil society to a degree that may become problematic for the regime.
Geir Flikke
University of Oslo
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Conflicting Opportunities or Patronal Politics? Restrictive NGO Legislation in Russia 2012–2015, Europe Asia Studies, April 2018, Taylor & Francis,
DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2018.1455806.
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