What is it about?
This paper examines how two prominent corporate governance models, namely the shareholder (common-law countries) and stakeholder models (code- law countries), have different effects on the relation between agency conflicts and the supply, and demand of audit services.
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Why is it important?
This research is important in providing a better understanding of the incorporation of agency conflicts into the pricing of audit services and their effect on the role of the auditor. Furthermore, it provides a model that helps clarify previous confounding results regarding this matter.
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This page is a summary of: Blockholders’ Ownership and Audit Fees: The Impact of the Corporate Governance Model, European Accounting Review, October 2016, Taylor & Francis,
DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2016.1243483.
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