Whispers from Below: Zionist Secret Diplomacy, Terrorism and British Security Inside and Out of Palestine, 1944–47

What is it about?

This article compares Jewish terrorism in Palestine, the wider Middle East, Europe and the UK. In it, I argue that British security succeeded when it had the cooperation of the Jewish Agency, the self-governing body of the Jewish community of Palestine (Yishuv). Security failed to prevent terrorism where the Jewish Agency's intelligence would not cooperate with its British counterparts. Those decisions were tied directly to the interests of the Zionist movement, which was resisting British restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine after the Second World War. So where it would be seen as a PR disaster, such as in the UK or Cairo, Zionist intelligence offered useful assistance. Where it helped prove the point, such as Europe or Palestine, Zionist intelligence allowed terrorists to strike without informing the British. This was part of a broader effort to coerce a change in British policy. Finally, I argue that British policy neglected to complete a net assessment of its own will and ability to uphold immigration restrictions against the will and ability of its main partners in Palestine, the Zionists, to fight those restrictions.

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Why is it important?

This article deals with a number important issues. It is a unique survey of intelligence, terrorism and decolonizaiton. It is also an important counterargument to authors who have discussed intelligence failure as a main cause of security failure in Palestine. The situation was more complex than that; the problem was about policy. It also shows how complex a problem was the issue of British dependency on Zionist intelligence cooperation. This is often overlooked in the story of the Mandate, but it is critical to understanding the power dynamic which unraveled, and led to Britain's exit from Palestine.

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