What is it about?
This paper British intelligence on the three main Jewish underground groups in Palestine during their united campaign against Britain in 1945-46. It assesses the question of Britain's "intelligence failure" in the fight against terrorism, arguing that the situation was more complex than a question of failure of success of intelligence. The key decision maker, Alan Cunningham, based his decisions not on intelligence but on a broader reading of Zionist politics. Intelligence in Palestine lacked security and good information on terrorism. It fell victim to deception which, for many months, disguised the fact that Britain's erstwhile partner, the Haganah, had joined forces with the terrorist organizations Irgun and Stern Gang (Lehi). Finally, the article argues that policy was a bigger problem than intelligence, since even perfect intelligence would not have addressed the source of the anti-British campaign.
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Why is it important?
This was the first study to look at these issues using newly declassified documents from the UK. It also used Hebrew language sources, and so offered an original argument about intelligence failure, and whether that was as big a problem as the deeper policy conflicts which led to violence in Palestine. In one sense, it is a case study in intelligence, counter terrorism, policy and strategy. It is also a new and improved telling of the story of decolonization in Palestine and the road to Israeli independence.
Perspectives
This was my first article. I finished it as an undergraduate at the University of Calgary with significant help from John Ferris, who got my career started in the process. So far as I understand, it remains the only undergraduate paper published in intelligence and national security. I remain proud of this work, which has been the basis of my research career. To me, it seems these arguments still hold up after nearly a decade. The process of going through recently declassified records and comparing them to Hebrew records as well as material varyingly shared by, stolen from, or left behind by Britian in Israel got me hooked on a research career. Seeing how these documents were organized in the original files inspired me to create my own digital database and index of security service records, which has since expanded to a 50gb library of records from 21 archives from the United States, Israel, United Kingdom and Canada.
Dr Steven Wagner
Brunel University
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: British Intelligence and the Jewish Resistance Movement in the Palestine Mandate, 1945–46, Intelligence & National Security, October 2008, Taylor & Francis,
DOI: 10.1080/02684520802449500.
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