What is it about?

How do people think and act on purpose? This paper compares Daniel Dennett (science and evolution), Alvin Plantinga (a God given mind), and Roger Scruton (culture and personal experience). Together, they show that freedom and responsibility have many sources. Cognitive science can weave these views by linking brain processes, learned meanings, and built-in beliefs. It models how biology, culture, and values combine to guide choice: the feeling that our thoughts are about something to which we are related and that we can act autonomously upon them.

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Why is it important?

This work brings three usually separate views (science, faith, and culture) into one clear, practical conversation. It is timely as artificial intelligence and brain research reshape how we talk about mind, free will, and responsibility. The result is a simple map that can guide research, teaching, and public debate toward more balanced, human‑centered answers.

Perspectives

Today, artificial intelligence headlines and brain studies can make us think that people are merely machines or just collections of beliefs. Reality is blurred. I argue for a more comprehensive picture that keeps biology, meaning, and values in view simultaneously. If we get that balance right, our research, teaching, and public discussions will be more human-centered and more useful. My view is that cognitive science can act as a bridge. It links brain processes with lived experience and moral concerns, so we can test ideas without losing what makes us human. This integrated lens can guide better studies, clearer policies, and wiser conversations about autonomy and responsibility.

Szabolcs Kéri

Read the Original

This page is a summary of: The acting mind: Dennett, Plantinga, and Scruton on intentionality and agency., Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, September 2025, American Psychological Association (APA),
DOI: 10.1037/teo0000330.
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