Is cognitive science stuck in the 17th century?

What is it about?

Cognitive science may be teetering on the edge of a paradigm shift. For the past few decades, theoretical accounts in the study of how minds work have taken something of a “pragmatic turn”. In large part, this turn has to do with a reconceptualization of what minds do: having less to do with accurately describing the world and more to do with facilitating action. Traditional theoretical frameworks in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, going all the way back to 17th Century thinkers like René Descartes and John Locke, conceptualized the mind in terms of primarily descriptive states supported by neuronal computations alone. By contrast, contemporary accounts from cognitive science more and more emphasize dynamic interactions involving brains, bodies and environments alike. One of the refrains of contemporary cognitive science – coming from cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy of mind alike – is thus that we ought to break with this Cartesian heritage and its overly intellectualized view of minds. The question is whether such a shift is even possible within the currently prescribed parameters of cognitive science itself.

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Photo by Europeana on Unsplash

Photo by Europeana on Unsplash

Why is it important?

Despite calls for a shift in cognitive science, the Cartesian standard view continues to dominate the field. Part of the issue here is that the overly intellectualized view of how minds work may be a result of the way that cognitive science is set up. One can trace the Cartesian paradigm in cognitive science to core methodological commitments within cognitive science as a field of study. These include the commitment to study cognition and behavior at the level of isolated individuals. This shows how methodological choices influence how the object of our study (including minds and cognition) turns out. The Cartesian picture of the mind may thus be understood as an artefact of his methodological approach. In particular, the pursuit of understanding the mind as it exists in itself – apart from interactions with the broader world. This is important because whereas contemporary cognitive science often criticizes the Cartesian picture, the approach which gave (and continues to give) rise to this picture, has remained intact in cognitive science up until today. If the much-criticized Cartesian standard in cognitive science is a result of its methodological setup - one which continues to define the field - this may help explain the persistence of the standard view.

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