What is it about?
Psychologists often distinguish between direct and conceptual replications. Machery’s (2020) Resampling Account of Replications (RAR) abolishes this distinction. Matarese (2023) argues for a novel interpretation of the direct-conceptual replication distinction. I argue in this commentary that Matarese does not succeed.
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Why is it important?
Psychologists often disagree on the relative merits of direct and conceptual replications. Machery’s RAR has the potential to resolve all these by simply abolishing the distinction.
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This page is a summary of: In defense of the resampling account of replication., Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, November 2023, American Psychological Association (APA),
DOI: 10.1037/teo0000224.
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