What is it about?
People across different cultures and historical periods rarely use "chance" to explain events, instead preferring to find causes or entities such as "luck" or supernatural forces. This paper examines why chance explanations are uncommon, highlighting psychological biases, cultural traditions, and how people cognitively manage uncertainty. By combining ethnographic evidence, historical analysis, and cognitive science, I argue that recognizing randomness as a valid explanation is a relatively modern development. This shift profoundly affects how we understand uncertainty and manage risk today.
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Why is it important?
Understanding why humans historically avoided "chance" explanations helps us see how deeply our psychological tendencies shape beliefs and practices. In a world increasingly governed by probabilities—like weather forecasts, medical statistics, or election predictions—recognizing the historical reluctance toward chance highlights how our modern mindset differs from traditional worldviews. This understanding can help improve communication about uncertainty and decision-making processes, making us better equipped to handle the inherent unpredictability of life.
Perspectives
Exploring the cognitive and cultural roots of why humans often reject "chance" as an explanation was fascinating. It reveals a deep psychological desire for control and meaning in our lives, even when faced with genuine randomness. I hope this article encourages readers to reflect on their assumptions about causality, luck, and uncertainty, enhancing their understanding of how they interpret and respond to events in everyday life.
Ze Hong
University of Macau
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Chance as a (non)explanation: A cross-cultural examination of folk understanding of chance and coincidence., Psychological Review, May 2025, American Psychological Association (APA),
DOI: 10.1037/rev0000568.
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