What is it about?
This research explores the institutional foundations of agricultural protectionism in Japan, focusing on analysis of Japan's postwar politics. The findings demonstrate that there are stronger incentives for Japanese farmers to generate support for the governing party in a multimember district system (MMD) than in a single-member district system (SMD).
Photo by no one cares on Unsplash
Why is it important?
The qualitative analysis of Japan's postwar politics and its relationship with agricultural protectionism demonstrates the differing incentive structures created by MMD and SMD systems. The application of such distinction can be more broadly applied to various political institutions beyond Japan.
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Cultivating Rice and Votes: The Institutional Origins of Agricultural Protectionism in Japan, Journal of East Asian Studies, December 2010, Cambridge University Press, DOI: 10.1017/s1598240800003684.
You can read the full text:
The following have contributed to this page