All Stories

  1. Does the Type of Debt Matter? Stock Market Perception in Europe
  2. Debt Renegotiation and the Design of Financial Contracts
  3. Financial Institutions Network and the Certification Value of Bank Loans
  4. How sukuk shapes firm performance
  5. Initial Conditions and the Private Debt Renegotiation Process
  6. Do the type of sukuk and choice of shari’a scholar matter?
  7. Debt Renegotiation and the Design of Financial Contracts
  8. The dynamics of bank debt renegotiation in Europe: A survival analysis approach
  9. The certification value of private debt renegotiation and the design of financial contracts
  10. Does the Type of Debt Matter? Stock Market Perception in Europe (Velka Kuin Velka Vai Mitt Mieltt Euroopan Osakemarkkinat Ovat?)
  11. The determinants of multiple bank loan renegotiations in Europe
  12. Do the Type of Sukuk and Choice of Shari'a Scholar Matter?
  13. Bank loans and borrower value during the global financial crisis: Empirical evidence from France
  14. What Influences Stock Market Reaction to Sukuk Issues? The Impact of Scholars and Sukuk Types
  15. The Network and Reputation of Financial Institutions and the Certification Value of Bank Loans
  16. Do the Type of Sukuk and Choice of Shariia Scholar Matter?
  17. Why Do Large Firms Opt for Islamic Loans?
  18. Sukuk vs. conventional bonds: A stock market perspective
  19. Risk management, soft information and bankers' incentives
  20. Building Reputation on the Syndicated Lending Market: A Participant Bank Perspective
  21. Determinants of Multiple Bank Loan Renegotiations in Europe
  22. What Drives the Dynamics of Bank Loan Renegotiation in Europe?
  23. Foreign bank lending and information asymmetries in China
  24. Bank Competition and Collateral: Theory and Evidence
  25. Bank Lending Networks, Experience, Reputation, and Borrowing Costs
  26. Does Renegotiation of Financial Contracts Matter for Shareholders? Empirical Evidence from Europe
  27. Why Do Large Firms Go for Islamic Loans?
  28. Why Do Large Firms Go for Islamic Loans?
  29. Are Bank Loans Still 'Special' (Especially During a Crisis)? Empirical Evidence from a European Country
  30. Stock Market Reaction to Debt Financing Arrangements in Russia
  31. La structure du pool bancaire et son contenu informatif
  32. Asymmetric Information and Loan Spreads in Russia
  33. Are Bank Loans Still 'Special' (Especially During a Crisis)? Empirical Evidence from a European Country
  34. Do Markets Perceive Sukuk and Conventional Bonds as Different Financing Instruments?
  35. Does Collateral Help Mitigate Adverse Selection? A Cross-Country Analysis
  36. Banking environment and loan syndicate structure: a cross-country analysis
  37. Better Borrowers, Fewer Banks?
  38. Are Islamic Investment Certificates Special? Evidence on the Post-Announcement Performance of Sukuk Issues
  39. Bank Lending Networks, Experience, Reputation and Borrowing Costs
  40. Foreign Bank Lending and Information Asymmetries in China
  41. Stock Market Reaction to Debt Financing Arrangements in Russia
  42. Bank Lending Networks, Experience, Reputation, and Borrowing Costs
  43. Are Islamic Investment Certificates Special? Evidence on the Post-Announcement Performance of Sukuk Issues
  44. Collateral and Adverse Selection in Transition Countries
  45. Asymmetric Information and Loan Spreads in Russia: Evidence from Syndicated Loans
  46. Concentration in Corporate Bank Loans - What Do We Learn from European Comparisons?
  47. How to Get a Syndicated Loan Fast? The Role of Syndicate Composition and Organization
  48. Syndicated loans in emerging markets
  49. Bank Competition and Collateral: Theory and Evidence
  50. Banking Environment, Agency Costs, and Loan Syndication: A Cross-Country Analysis
  51. Collateral and Adverse Selection in Transition Countries
  52. Duration of Loan Arrangement and Syndicate Structure
  53. Duration of Syndication Process and Syndicate Organization
  54. How Many Banks Does it Take to Lend? Empirical Evidence from Europe
  55. Banking Environment and Syndicate Structure: A Cross‐Country Analysis
  56. Bank Competition and Collateral: Theory and Evidence
  57. Are Ratings Consistent with Default Probabilities?
  58. Syndicated Loans in Emerging Markets
  59. The Design of Bank Loan Syndicates in Emerging Markets Economies
  60. Regulatory and Institutional Determinants of Credit Risk Taking and a Bank's Default
  61. Does Collateral Help Mitigate Adverse Selection? A Cross-Country Analysis
  62. Bank capital and credit risk taking in emerging market economies
  63. Credit Risk Management in Banks: Hard Information, Soft Information and Manipulation
  64. Excess Credit Risk and Banks’ Default Risk: An Application of Default Prediction Models to Banks in Emerging Market Economies
  65. Are Bank Ratings Coherent with Bank Default Probabilities in Emerging Market Economies?
  66. Bank Risk-Taking in a Prospect Theory Framework Empirical Investigation in the Emerging Markets' Case
  67. Capital Regulation and Credit Risk Taking: Empirical Evidence from Banks in Emerging Market Economies
  68. Excess Credit Risk and Bank's Default Risk: An Application of Default Prediction's Models to Banks from Emerging Market Economies
  69. Role of the Nature of Information in the Banking Intermediation (Role de la Nature de l'Information dans l'Intermediation Bancaire)
  70. Study of the Coherence of the Ratings of Banks with the Probability of Failure Banking in the Emergent Countries (Etude de la Coherence des Ratings de Banques avec la Probabilite de Defaillance Bancaire dans les Pays Emergents)
  71. The Influence of Institutional Factors on Excess Risk and Bank Ratings in Emerging Market Economies
  72. The Role of Regulatory, Legal and Institutional Environments in Bank Default: The Case of Emerging Market Economies
  73. Bank's Default Modelisation and Regulatory Factors: An Application to Banks from Emerging Market Economies
  74. Bank's Default Modelisation: An Application to Banks from Emerging Market Economies
  75. Bank's Default Modelisation and Regulatory Factors: An Application to Banks from Emerging Market Economies