On Truth, the Truth of Existence, and the Existence of Truth

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Summary of the article: This article argues that intuitive cognition, which according to Scotus cognizes the actual presence of things, does not in fact cognize existence itself, but rather existential truths that follow from the existence of a thing (res). In order to understand the relationship between existence, the being of a ‘thing,’ and truth, we examine an internal tension in Anselm’s dual conception of truth as ‘rectitude’. His doctrine maintains that rectitude follows a. essentially according to the whatness of a thing, b. teleologically as a thing’s existence serves a purpose. We show that the tension between the two rectitudes finds an echo in the later development of the transcendental notion of a thing. We further show how Scotus’ criticism of the ontology of things can be interpreted at once as a criticism and a correction of Anselm’s dual conception of rectitude. We claim that these two types of truth are formal truths and reflect the duality of the truth of the intellect and of the will. Scotus submits that only the will perfects rationality. But how are we to understand the meaning of the ‘truth of the will’ or the way in which it perfects rationality? The answer lies in a dual interpretation of what it means to will something into existence: a. as to whether a thing should come to be, b. as the act of putting into existence. Putting into existence can be further interpreted according to two senses of being placed: Either, a. placed into an essential place that corresponds to the intellect, or, b. placed into an existential place that produces new contingent “truths” as a result of the actualization. Through an instrumental comparison with Kant’s treatment of geometry, we establish that truths of the will can be conceived as synthetic a priori truths. This explains why they perfect rationality. And by interpreting synthetic a priori truth as truths of the will, which are actually truths of existence, we are able to turn Scotus’ argument against Kant’s claim that “the actual con¬tains nothing more than the merely possible”.

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