What is it about?

This paper seeks to explain variation in agricultural policy across regime type. It argues that socio-economic structures and institutions interact to generate policy outcomes. Because authoritarian governments are less responsive to electoral incentives and thus to the interests of the rural population, they implement urban-biased policies that decrease returns to farmers compared to democracies, on average. However, higher levels of agricultural support occur under autocracy when landholding inequality creates a small, powerful landed elite. Income inequality generates redistributive pressure under democracy and hampers food consumers’ ability to mobilize against authoritarian regimes, also leading to relatively high levels of support for agriculture among autocracies. When urban interests are powerful, autocracies provide lower levels of agricultural support than do democracies, which also implies lower food prices.

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Why is it important?

Agricultural policy-making is an important but under-explored aspect of authoritarian rule. This paper advances a theory which can explain a wide range of variation in these policies.

Perspectives

Arguments about dictatorship and urban bias are very influential in theories of the political economy of development and democratization. This paper shows under which conditions urban bias is likely to arise, and when it is not.

Henry Thomson
Arizona State University

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This page is a summary of: Food and Power: Agricultural Policy under Democracy and Dictatorship, Comparative Politics, January 2017, Comparative Politics,
DOI: 10.5129/001041517820201387.
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