Tipologi Kewenangan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Menggantikan Hakim Mahkamah Konstitusi Dalam Masa Jabatan

What is it about?

The replacement of Aswanto as a judge of the Constitutional Court (MK) during his term of office by the House of Representatives (DPR) is suspected to be a political determination of the Court and interventionist in nature. Although given the attribution to do so, the authority cannot be exercised lightly. This research seeks to examine the typology of the inherent authority of the DPR to replace MK judges during their tenure and the constitutional design of the replacement process. This research utilizes normative research with legislative, conceptual, and case approaches. This research found that the typology of DPR's authority to replace MK judges during their tenure is an attribution that is limited causality because it depends on the attribution of the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court as the prima facy entity to justify the reason for replacement as well as the president as the entity that issues the dismissal stipulation.In this context, it is the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court who has the authority to detect the reasons that justify the dismissal of a Constitutional Court judge during his/her term of office. The design of constitutionalism in the process is seen when there is a limited institutional authority relationship between the Constitutional Court, the President, and the DPR. This means that the DPR, before proposing the replacement of a judge, must start from the process of justification for dismissal by the chairman of the Constitutional Court and affirmed by the president as the basis for issuing a determination of dismissal. In this process, it can be seen that the position between institutions does not run dichotomously but rather supervises each other according to the reasoning of constitutionalism

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