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This essay reviews Nicholas Baima's and Tyler Paytas's recent book, Plato's Pragmatism. The authors argue against scholarly consensus that Plato is better understood as having a pragmatist outlook than an "alethic" outlook (i.e., one where truth is always preferable to falsehood). They argue that Plato takes promoting and upholding the right ethical commitments to be more important than promoting and upholding truth. As a result, if there is a conflict between how we ought to act and how we ought to engage with truth and knowledge, we are licensed to break the norms for truth (e.g., we may lie) if doing so promotes the development of good character and right action. After synthesizing the authors' arguments, I argue that the authors miss some important textual details that affect their reading, make certain philosophical mistakes, and, ultimately, fail to substantiate their interpretation. Nevertheless, I suggest that the book is a valuable work of scholarship that deserves engagement from the scholarly community.

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This page is a summary of: Plato’s Pragmatism: Rethinking the Relationship Between Ethics and Epistemology, written by Baima, N.R. & Paytas, T., History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, April 2024, Brill Deutschland GmbH,
DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10089.
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