Leibniz’s Causal Road to Existential Independence

What is it about?

All Leibniz scholars agree that he denies that substances (including everyday objects like you, me, and your cat) can causally interact with one another. But Leibniz scholars are divided on whether he thinks substances' very existence are tied up with each other. I offer a new interpretation of Leibniz, grounded in his texts but also in a reconstruction of what his views commit him to, showing that his denial of causal interaction (which is uncontroversial), plus a mainstream interpretation of his views on essentialism (roughly, what a given thing must necessarily be like if it exists at all), settles the controversy about substances' existence being tied up together. Given his views on causal interaction and essentialism, he must deny that substances' existence are tied up with each other. In presenting this interpretation and argument, I also offer a new way to settle a related and long-standing debate among Leibniz scholars over the question of what Leibniz means when he says that some possible substances aren't "compossible" with others.

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