What is it about?
The U.S. relies heavily on foreign suppliers for critical satellite and rocket components. This paper introduces a scoring system (SoSTI) to measure that dependency and proposes a phased plan (new domestic factories, secure innovation hubs, and resilient designs) to fix it.
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Why is it important?
This paper addresses a vulnerability that has moved from theoretical to operational: GAO reports confirm that supply chain shortages have delayed the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) by up to 12 months, and China controls the majority of global rare-earth processing, giving it direct leverage over U.S. satellite programs. The paper's central contribution [the Sovereign Space Technology Index (SoSTI)] is novel because it integrates four dimensions (domestic content, cybersecurity posture, lifecycle sustainability, and geopolitical risk exposure) into a single actionable score, weighted by mission criticality through the Analytic Hierarchy Process. No existing metric (DPAS ratings, Buy American thresholds, FAR/DFARS standards) captures all four dimensions simultaneously. The quantitative modeling is striking: achieving a SoSTI score of 0.80 could reduce supply chain risk exposure by 63.4%, nearly halve catastrophic loss probability (from 57% to 27%), and yield approximately $1.2 billion in cumulative insurance savings for a 500-satellite constellation. The three-phase reindustrialization roadmap (from National Space Foundries to full-stack cislunar sovereignty) provides policymakers with a concrete, time-bound execution plan rather than a general call to action. Space is now a contested domain and technological dependency is a deterrence liability.
Perspectives
Majority agree that depending on foreign suppliers for radiation-hardened chips and rare-earth magnets is risky. The GAO says so. The Space Force says so. But few papers move beyond cataloging vulnerabilities to proposing a quantifiable, phased solution with specific metrics and investment mechanisms. The SoSTI was born from a practical question: if I were a program manager at the Space Development Agency, how would I decide whether Satellite Bus A or Satellite Bus B is more "sovereign"? The answer cannot be "count the domestic parts," because a bus with 90% domestic content but unvetted software is arguably more vulnerable than one with 70% domestic content and a zero-trust cybersecurity architecture. SoSTI captures that nuance. I am also candid about limitations. The model assumes component scores are statistically independent when they are likely correlated, and the insurance projections use order-of-magnitude assumptions rather than proprietary actuarial data. I flagged these explicitly because I believe a framework that acknowledges its uncertainty is more useful to policymakers than one that presents false precision. Ultimately, I see sovereignty not as isolationism but as the foundation for stronger alliances. The Artemis Accords now have over 60 signatories, and those partnerships are more credible when the U.S. can guarantee interoperability from a position of assured domestic capability over dependency.
Wanjiku Chebet Kanjumba
University of Florida
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: American Technological Sovereignty in Space: A Quantitative Framework and Phased Roadmap for Strategic Independence, May 2026, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA),
DOI: 10.2514/6.2026-3061.
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