The Explanatory Gap Argument and Phenomenal States: A Defense of Philosophy

What is it about?

The focus of this paper is the explanatory gap argument, which is one of the three arguments offered in support of the dualist position that contrary to the submission of physicalism that the world is entirely physical, there is the phenomena consciousness, as a separate, non-physical ontological entity in the world. It supports the physicalists’ response to the explanatory gap argument. It questions the inference of ontologically distinct properties of mental states from the inability to offer a conceptual account of one kind of properties in terms of the explanation offered for another kind of properties. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section carefully articulates the explanatory gap argument. The second section argues that the explanatory gap argument fails to support the reality of a property of consciousness which is not amenable to scientific investigation and theories. This is a contribution in the Philosophy of Mind.

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Why is it important?

The paper provides a physicalist insight into the assessment of the dualist's claim that there are substances and properties that are not accessible to scientific investigation.

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