Energy security of the Ukraine and EU in the face of the Russian aggression

What is it about?

The energy security of EU is one of the most important directives of the EU and Ukrainian policy.However, the fact that European politicians underestimated the hazards related to the scale of en-ergy resources imported from Russia and its geopolitical ambitions revealed the shortcomings ofthe European strategy. Following the Russian aggression in February 2022, the strategic EU methodis to ensure the energy independence of the region and the energy security of all member states.This article is devoted to analysing the Russian invasion impact on the energy security of EU andthe Ukraine. It analyses major ideas of EU energy policy reform in the face of the Russian invasionof the Ukraine and the perspectives of restoring energy security of European states. The selectedsystemic and structural‑functional analysis enabled not only to discuss the EU energy securityaspects more broadly, but also to emphasize key problems in the short‑ and long‑term perspective.Keywords: The Ukraine, EU energy security, Russian aggression of the Ukraine, energy resources

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Photo by Tina Hartung on Unsplash

Photo by Tina Hartung on Unsplash

Why is it important?

At the current level of civilization development, energy has become something more than just a branch of the economy. The future of humanity depends on energy, including the extent to which we can guarantee the security of its supplies to enterprises. The energy transformation was planned as climate protection, but today it takes on a much larger and more important dimension. This is one of the theses of this year's ClimateChange Conference. Talks about achieving climate or environmental goals fell into the background when the war broke out, which not only limited funds for energy reforms in Europe, but also in Ukraine catastrophically worsened the state of the environment and destroyed the economy. The EU's energy dependence on Russia makes it difficult for the West to respond decisively, aimed at isolating the economy and paralyzing Russia's military machine. Fortunately, in Western Europe there is a process of fundamental verification of the current energy policy. The climate crisis and Putin's energy blackmail emphasize the need for EU countries to take a comprehensive approach to energy policy, taking into account both climate change and the risks and consequences of pursuing a distant policy towards Russia. As a result, Russia's military actions, e.g. at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, may result in a Fukushima-like disaster, which may lead to the verification of the current climate goals of the entire progressive world. Highly sustainable energy systems are needed. The Ukrainian energy system was highly efficient during the war, was synchronized with ENTSO-E and supplied electricity to the EU for some time. However, no energy system can withstand continuous, targeted, massive missile attacks. Effective protection of energy facilities should become as important an aspect of the energy transformation as zero-emission generation. It is necessary to expand the protection system against physical interception or destruction energy infrastructure facilities responsible for the safety of citizens' lives. A system of such protection should be established in advance when creating new energy systems in the EU and some of its neighbors. Perhaps NATO can provide such protection. Given the changing geopolitical situation, perhaps a different international structure would be more appropriate. Their protection should be subject to international law. An attack on energy infrastructure should automatically trigger a collective response mechanism - only in this way will it be possible to avoid an ecological (more on losses in this regard: Gardashuk, 2022) or humanitarian disaster. Currently, the contours of the energy security architecture of the 21st century are being laid in Ukraine. In addition, a package of strict collective sanctions should be agreed at the international level, which will be triggered in the event of an attack on the energy system of any country. These sanctions should be established preventively, not after the fact of armed aggression. Each aggressor must know the scale of the consequences that it will suffer after an attack on the energy sector of another country. Until the systems described above are implemented, Ukraine should receive a sufficient number of modern air defense systems to be able to independently protect itself against air attacks and protect its energy infrastructure. Ukraine also needs more equipment and materials to cover the most urgent repair needs resulting from the constant shelling of this architecture. In the event of a Russian invasion, there should be a top-down refusal to import energy carriers, nuclear fuel, expertise and raw materials. Moreover, for Russian scientists, significant restrictions should be introduced on access to new technologies, research and scientific cooperation, which could be a pretext to bypass sanctions or use knowledge to continue military aggression. The future of the EU and Ukraine energy system lies in the creation of decentralized energy regions and self-sufficient energetically. In the face of war, the European Commissioner for Energy, Kadri Simson, confirmed (during her stay in Kiev) the EU's previous plans to decentralize the energy system and create reserve generation (Ukrayinsʹka Enerhetyka, 2022). Plans for alternative electricity generation and transmission are needed at all levels - state and regional. At the same time, decentralization can serve the unity of EU goals. Small countries should feel as protected as large ones - due to common policy and the possibility of receiving external help. It is understandable that these two crises - climate security and energy security - must be solved together.

Perspectives