Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms

What is it about?

This paper was published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.002). The following is the research highlights for this paper: - Punishment intensity per third party decreases only mildly as the number of third party punishers increases in a group where a prisoner’s dilemma interaction takes place. - Having a sufficiently large number of third parties is helpful in preventing players from selecting defection because of third party punishment. - Having too many third party players is harmful because aggregate punishment becomes too strong and even cooperators might be punished severely. - Third parties’ punishment intensity is positively correlated with their beliefs on peers’ punishment behaviors. - Third parties prohibit punishment of cooperators and limit over-punishment targeted at norm violators when they are given a chance to democratically decide on the levels of punishment through voting.

Featured Image