What is it about?
Through an investigation of selected jurisdictions, this paper aims to contribute to the extant literature in investigating the relationship between central bank independence and price stability, as well as how such a relationship varies between different jurisdictions – even though it is widely argued that political and legislative interference is often contributory to price instability.
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Why is it important?
This paper employs times series data to study the dynamics of central bank independence. It also employs bivariate cointegration methodology to examine the long-term relationship between inflation index and the different measures of financial development.
Perspectives
In diesem Artikel werden Zeitreihendaten verwendet, um die Dynamik der Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank zu untersuchen. Es verwendet auch eine bivariate Kointegrationsmethode, um die langfristige Beziehung zwischen dem Inflationsindex und den verschiedenen Maßnahmen zur finanziellen Entwicklung zu untersuchen.
Prof Marianne Ojo
Northwestern University
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Central Bank Independence: Monetary Policies in Selected Jurisdictions (I) - The Dynamics of Central Bank Independence in a Developing Economy, SSRN Electronic Journal, Elsevier,
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2240814.
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