What is it about?
A moral sceptic believes that there are no moral truths and no moral values. Because there are no moral values out there in the world that exist independent of us, moral claims are unfounded. In this paper, I investigate whether these two claims can come apart. That is, whether the non-existence of mind-independent values really does entail the falsity of all moral claims.
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Why is it important?
This separation is a novel move. It was previously assumed that the non-existence of such mind-independent moral values favors the moral sceptic, but I argue that it is also compatible with certain theories of moral truth.
Perspectives
This paper is a result of my Master's Thesis, which I wrote during the '15-'16 academic year. My views have evolved since then and although the morality as social knowledge account still attracts me in a way, I'm no longer convinced that it can in fact legitimately talk of moral truth, nor am I still supporting the non-cognitivist view of morality that I advertise in this paper. I guess one could say I have become more error-theoretic over the last year.
Maarten Van Doorn
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Mind-Independent Values Don’t Exist, But Moral Truth Does, Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism, April 2017, Equinox Publishing,
DOI: 10.1558/eph.33214.
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