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In this paper I analyze the nature of insults – a subject that has been rather neglected in the philosophical literature. I claim that an insult has to do with causing us to lose face. Each and every one of us has a face, which is what we show to the public. We save face with regards to everybody else, and thus each member of the public is supposedly liable to insult us, i.e. to expose us and make us lose face. In this sense, our interlocutor serves both as an individual encountering us face-to-face, and as an audience in front of whom our weaknesses are exposed. When the insult involves something we know to be wrong, we can try a refute it. This might be difficult to do, especially if our status is not well-established to begin with, e.g. if we belong to a minority group that is discriminated against. When the insult is true, that task might be not only difficult but impossible. We cannot rebut it. The insulter has drawn attention to a fact about us that we wished to be unnoticeable. He has hurt us where we are most vulnerable. Should we then adopt a strategy of not caring about what others think, and not take offence? Not quite. We need the opinions of others because it is through interactions with our fellows that we explore and test our views, and even our identity. Our dependence upon others might be a source of offence as much as it can serve as a source of hope for self-improvement.

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This page is a summary of: Insulting and losing face, Human Affairs, January 2018, De Gruyter,
DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2018-0004.
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