What is it about?
Immanuel Kant states that “one who makes himself a worm cannot complain afterwards if people step on him” . In this paper I explain, why it is a duty toward oneself not to make oneself a worm, but to respect one's own dignity and avoid servility. I argue that this means to respect oneself as an autonomous and (potentially) rational and reasonable human being, but one also owes to oneself a more individual kind of self-respect towards the ability to embody dignity and to realize a dignified life. Finally I discuss why, even though persons can behave like worms, others ought not to step on them.
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Why is it important?
The paper adds an important contribution to current debates about the concept of dignity, because it sheds new light on the relation of persons towards their own dignity and it shows how different aspects of this concept complement one another in a differentiated understanding of self-respect.
Perspectives
Human dignity is innate, not meritorious, and it is the origin of inalienable rights – or at least inseparable from those rights. It is proclaimed in defense against violations of a human being through another human being or through particular circumstances and social or institutional structures. The idea that human beings may violate their own dignity and "make themselves worms" is thus provoking - in particular in the context of Kant's own philosophy. A debate about this provocation shall contribute to a more differentiated discussion about the question what exactly we ought to respect by respecting our own dignity and the dignity of others.
Katharina Bauer
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
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This page is a summary of: „Wer sich aber zum Wurm macht …“ – Würde als Selbstverpflichtung, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, October 2018, De Gruyter,
DOI: 10.1515/dzph-2018-0043.
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