Adorno über Kant und das Verhältnis von Ästhetik und Metaphysik

What is it about?

In this article I inquire into the interpretation of Kant’s philosophy provided by Theodor W. Adorno. In particular, I move from a few key concepts of his philosophy (dialectics, aesthetics, non-identity, transcendence, appearance, truth, hope, utopia) and attempt to show that such a conceptual constellation testifies to how much Adorno was theoretically indebted to the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Specifically, Kant’s conception of aesthetics and dialectics is crucial to Adorno’s conception of those same concepts and problems.

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Why is it important?

This article is important because it shows that Adorno's concept of dialectics, although surely influenced by Hegel's, is not reducible to it. That is, it cannot be merely interpreted as a "negative" reaction to, or a "negative" reversal of, Hegel's "affirmative" concept of dialectics. Rather, in order to be properly understood Adorno's negative way to dialectical thought must be also interpreted in light of his critical reception of Kant's concept of transcendental dialectics and thus of metaphysics. This, in turn, leads to inquire into the relationship between transcendence (dialectics) and semblance (aesthetics), and discloses new perspectives for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of Adorno's concept of aesthetics.

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