What is it about?
This essay defends the following thesis: Mutual recognition and justice as a virtue (JAV) are crucial elements for classifying expectations in the realm of law. The law generates and protects legitimate expectations at the same time. We can distinguish between three categories of expectations: Mere hopes, legitimate expectations and vindicated (legitimate) expectations. That categorisation is of crucial importance for our legal rights. Yet the classification of expectations faces an uncertainty problem. Does that endanger the rationality of the Law? The essay argues that the law's rationality can be ensured through the practice of legal discourse. Mutual recognition and justice as a virtue are crucial elements for that discourse.
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Why is it important?
This essay illustrates how legal philosophy, discourse theory and private law theory help to understand the role of legitimate expectations in law.
Perspectives
Writing this article was very rewarding, because I could combine two of my favourite, yet seemingly little connected research areas (private law and philosophy of law) in a (hopefully) fruitful way.
Stefan Arnold
Westfalische Wilhelms-Universitat Munster
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This page is a summary of: Legitimate Expectations in the Realm of Law – Mutual Recognition, Justice as a Virtue and the Legitimacy of Expectations, Moral Philosophy and Politics, January 2017, De Gruyter,
DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2017-0035.
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