What is it about?
Peter Stemmer provides a moral theory that construes moral normativity and correlated phenomenona as essentially constituted by sanctions. Neither Stemmer nor his critics reflect sufficiently on the metaethical status of these claims, even though it is important to be clear about this status to evaluate the approach. I argue that there are two different readings of the theory: Either the “Sanktionstheorie” is a kind of descriptive metaethical theory or it is what I call a constructive (or revisionary) theory. Stemmer’s approach is better understood as a constructive metaethical theory, whereas critics mainly focus on a descriptive reading.
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Why is it important?
To fully understand the aim of Peter Stemmer's "Sanktonstheorie der Moral" it is important to differentiate between the aims of descriptive metaethics on the one hand and the aims of revisionary (or constructive) metaethics on the other hand. I will explain this important difference in aims and designs of metaethical theories and argue that Stemmer's theory is best understood as a version of constructive (as opposed to descriptive) metaethics.
Perspectives
I hope this article gives a new perspective for the critical evaluation of Peter Stemmer's theory of morality. It seems to me that the most common critiques of this theory confuse the important distinction between descriptive and constructive metaethics. The discussion of the "Sanktionstheorie der Moral" will profit from my elaborations on the distinction in the context of Stemmer's writings.
Dr. Christian Wendelborn
Universitat Konstanz
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This page is a summary of: Der Status von Peter Stemmers Metaethik, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, October 2018, De Gruyter,
DOI: 10.1515/dzph-2018-0048.
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