What is it about?

A lack of common knowledge can easily destabilize prices in speculative trading. We generalize a standard rational expectations equilibrium model with different information by allowing differences in higher-order beliefs. Bubbles can arise when investors have inconsistent higher-order beliefs that their own expectations are more optimistic than average.

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Why is it important?

We construct an analytically tractable equilibrium which can be used to simplify discussion of otherwise difficult issues concerning higher-order beliefs. The model nests conveniently into a standard rational expectations framework which assumes all parameters describing the economic environment are common knowledge.

Perspectives

This paper demonstrates that informational efficiency may be fragile in the presence of lack of common knowledge about investors’ beliefs.

Jungsuk Han
Handelshogskolan i Stockholm

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This page is a summary of: Speculative Equilibrium with Differences in Higher-Order Beliefs, Management Science, May 2017, INFORMS,
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2759.
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