What is it about?

We explore the price and reserve effect in crowdsourcing contests using a randomized field experiment.

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Why is it important?

The results inform contest and all-pay auction theory, as well as practitioners seeking to optimally design their crowdsourcing platform.

Perspectives

We find that a higher reward induces significantly more submissions and submissions of higher quality. In comparison, we find that high-quality users are significantly less likely to enter tasks where a high-quality solution has already been submitted, resulting in lower overall quality in subsequent submissions in such soft reserve treatments.

Professor Yan Chen
University of Michigan

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This page is a summary of: Crowdsourcing with All-Pay Auctions: A Field Experiment on Taskcn, Management Science, August 2014, INFORMS,
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1845.
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