Weak governments and inclusive trade unions are good for labour market outsiders

What is it about?

Some European welfare states protect precarious workers ("outsiders") from economic uncertainty better than others. Challenging conventional theories, this article argues that variation in the protection of outsiders results not from differences in producer group coalitions or partisanship alone, but from differences in the power-distributional interaction between trade unions and governments. Policy changes are responsive to the social demands of outsiders when (1) trade unions are inclusive to outsiders and (2) governments are too weak to pursue a unilateral reform strategy, and therefore need the support of trade unions in the reform process.

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Why is it important?

The article addresses the social protection of precarious workers in Europe. First, empirically, it shows that precarious workers are better protected in Austria than in Sweden, which effectively identifies a puzzle in light of the existing literature. Second, theoretically, the article challenges conventional approaches by demonstrating that the social protection of outsiders rests on the reliance of weak governments on trade union support.