Domestic Diversion

What is it about?

We analyze how the combination of diversionary incentive and out-group mobilization capabilities influences leaders’ decision-calculus. Embattled leaders make strategic decisions about both the target and the adequate severity of force to accomplish diversion without risking conflict escalation. We empirically test the resulting hypotheses using the Minorities at Risk dataset. We find that incentive alone does not determine domestic political use of force; the same incentive produces variance in the severity of force dependent on the targeted out-group’s mobilization capability. Governments match the severity of domestic force to political survival goals and the costs and risks of political use of force.

Featured Image

Why is it important?

Overall, we suggest that by selectively targeting out-groups with a calculated severity of force, leaders limit the risk of conflict escalation and maximize the likelihood of successful diversion. The article explores this strategic cost–benefit calculation and shows that the severity of domestic political use of force is conditioned by the combination of economic incentive and the targeted out-group’s mobilization capability. When out-groups lack organization and mobilization structures or are incapable of political or militant mobilization, leaders routinely refrain from excessive use of force. The ability of an out-group to achieve political mobilization increases the state’s severity of domestic political use of force. However, militarized actions are primarily reserved for militant organized out-groups. Domestic political use of force must sufficiently grab the public’s attention in order to serve diversionary purposes, but cannot be excessively violent and risk public backlash or spur an escalatory path of violence between the state and an out-group culminating in civil war.