What is it about?

Is impartiality possible or desirable within the conduct of political judgement? Many philosophers and democratic theorists say "no." This article provides an affirmative answer to this important question based upon the empirical study of deliberative democracy.

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Why is it important?

This article provides new evidence in support of the feasibility of impartiality as a moral and political value. We show that the aspiration for impartiality is best realized through the practice of deliberative democracy rather than the conduct of moral imagination or philosophic cognition.

Perspectives

This article is concerned with the principle of impartiality and the surprising disconnect that exists between the theory and practice of deliberative democracy in relation to this principle. Although many philosophers and democratic theorists have raised powerful challenges regarding the feasibility and desirability of impartiality, we assemble some original evidence based upon the study of mini-publics to show that a number of practical initiatives in democratic deliberation succeed in facilitating an ethic of impartiality while avoiding concerns about coercion and marginalization.

Professor Mark E. Button
University of Utah

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This page is a summary of: Impartiality in Political Judgment: Deliberative Not Philosophical, Political Studies, April 2016, SAGE Publications,
DOI: 10.1177/0032321715607513.
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