What is it about?
Since Locke, the concept of person has been closely linked to the idea of a subjective natural right and, later, to the concept of human rights. In this article we attempt to trouble this connection between humanity and personhood. While human rights are intended to offer protection to the “precarious” reality of human embodied life, we hypothesize that the fiction of legal personality generates a dis-embodiment whereby this human life is left exposed and defenseless.
Photo by DDP on Unsplash
Why is it important?
Human Rights fail to recognize and support the actual embodied condition of life because the 'legal person' to which human rights are attached is a 'disembodied' person. This article examines the consequence of this failure and proposes an entire novel, original conceptualization of human rights.
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Human Rights, Legal Personhood and the Impersonality of Embodied Life, Law Culture and the Humanities, June 2019, SAGE Publications, DOI: 10.1177/1743872119857068.
You can read the full text:
The following have contributed to this page