Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī’s Response to the Questions of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Kāshī

What is it about?

In a short treatise on the proof for the existence of a separate Intellect, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) argues for the existence of the Intellect as an external reservoir of truth, based on which the truth or falsehood of universal judgments can be examined by means of correspondence. In his commentary on al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, Ṭūsī presents a different proof for the existence of the Active Intellect as an external repository of the active forms. A certain Fakhr al-Dīn al-Kāshī posed a critical question regarding the two proofs to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311). In his response, Shīrāzī reveals his disagreement with Ṭūsī on this matter and undermines his proofs altogether. Adopting the view of Shams al-Dīn al-Kīshī (d. 694/1294–95), Shīrāzī argues that the truth or falsehood of judgments can be examined by analyzing the judgments themselves. The present article provides, for the first time, a critical edition of Shīrāzī's letter, together with a brief analysis of the question and its responses within their historical context.

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