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I question the received view that Frege advocates the description theory of proper names. First, I argue that the textual evidence for this view from Frege’s writings is not conclusive. Secondly, I propose that the Fregean Sinne (of proper names) may be understood nondescriptionally in terms of symbolhood. Finally, I suggest that in the notorious passages where Frege is apparently supporting the description theory he is just indicating the potential problems with communication with proper names. Keywords: Frege, Gottlob; sense and reference; description theory; proper names; definite descriptions; symbolhood.

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This page is a summary of: Frege and the Description Theory: An Attempt at Rehabilitation, Grazer Philosophische Studien, January 2015, Brill,
DOI: 10.1163/9789004310841_006.
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