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The article aims at enriching existing studies and suggests a methodology to view (and critically analyse) the equilibrium point between the autonomy of parliament and other constitutional principles. Hypotheses are proved in the article with regards to Italy. However, the hypotheses could easily also be and further tested with regards to other jurisdictions; although it is very likely that such a methodology would give different results for each jurisdiction, as the systems of constitutional justice (thus, the equilibrium point between the autonomy of Parliament and other constitutional principles) differ from one legal order to another. The hypotheses of the article are as follows. First, when it comes to such an equilibrium point, also supranational/international 'constitutional' principles should be considered. Some examples of case-law of the European Court of Justice and of the European Court on Human Rights, mainly concerning Italy, are given in the article. Secondly, such an equilibrium point should be viewed through the theoretical framework of the system of constitutional justice established domestically (i.e. types of standards, acts to be reviewed, jurisdictional disputes, subjects that can initiate disputes, violations of the Constitution).

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This page is a summary of: The Equilibrium Point Between the Autonomy of Parliament and Other Constitutional Principles, as Viewed Through The Theoretical Framework of a System of Constitutional Justice. Case-Study: Italy, International Journal of Parliamentary Studies, August 2022, De Gruyter,
DOI: 10.1163/26668912-bja10048.
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