Populism, Constitutional Counter-Narratives and Comparative Law

What is it about?

This article tries to explore the relationship between constitutionalism and populism in conceptual terms. This piece is divided into two parts. In Part I It will be argued that the relationship between populism and constitutionalism should not be seen in terms of mutual exclusion and perfect opposition . Indeed, it is possible to say that populism frequently relies on concepts and categories belonging to the language of constitutionalism (majority, democracy, people), trying to reshape them and offering in this way a sort of constitutional counter-narrative . In this sense the populist approach to constitutional categories can be described in light of two concepts: mimesis and parasitism. Both populism and constitutionalism are based on a profound sense of distrust towards political power and refer – prima facie – to similar concepts, but analogies cannot be extended further, as I shall show in this article. In constructing a constitutional narrative, populism borrows from the radical constitutional tradition, namely from the revolutionary (Jacobin ) one, as we will see. In Part II I shall look at comparative law in order to explore its incredible anti-populist potential. More in general, as I shall try to explain why the very idea of populist constitutionalism is not consistent with the legacy of post-totalitarian constitutionalism.

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