The False Hope of Self-Undermining Arguments against Skepticism: A Case Study

What is it about?

This paper argues against the prospect of self-undermining arguments against skepticism. The paper considers one example in the form of a recent argument by Susanna Rinard. In a nutshell, Rinard’s intriguing argument can be stated thus: any skeptical argument to the conclusion that complex reasoning fails to provide justification is self-undermining since the skeptical argument to that very conclusion itself consists of complex reasoning. Four objections will be raised: the first against the analogy Rinard claims to hold between two forms of skepticism and the other three in defense of the version of skepticism under attack. The second objection consist in distinguishing rationality, which both Rinard formulates the conclusions of their arguments in terms of, from justification. Relatedly, the third objection notes that Rinard does not show there being anything wrong with the skeptical arguments thus leaving the subject facing that threat unabated. Fourth, it can on the contrary be argued that even if Rinard reveals a self-undermining aspect, that result can instead be developed as support for a Pyrrhonist version of skepticism.

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