Goodness and Non-Univocity in Nicomachean Ethics 1.6

What is it about?

In his discussion of the highest good, namely happiness, Aristotle has things to say against the views which some of his opponents – most notably, his former Platonic companions - held about it. One of his arguments against them is that goodness is not univocal, and so it cannot be what they want it to be – a Form. The problem is, it is quite difficult to understand what Aristotle exactly means, when he claims that goodness is not univocal. The aim of this paper is to reach a better understanding of Aristotle's claim. I do this by considering the main available interpretations of Aristotle's argument and by advancing my own one. According to my interpretation, Aristotle thinks that goodness is not univocal because he believes that there are different things which are intrinsically good (where being 'intrinsically good' means being good because of the very thing they are) and that these different things are too diverse to make goodness univocal. If what I say is right, this notion of intrinsic goodness might have interesting implications for Aristotle' general view regarding the highest good – that, as he describes it, for the sake of which everything else is sought.

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