Does the failure to deter North Korea reveal a problem in our understanding of deterrence?

What is it about?

This study reveals that the theory of deterrence that guides policies of big powers towards other nations may be flawed. It does it first by showing how the theory does not pay attention to the fact that for persuading a country from doing something we need not just credibility of the threat of a punishment if it does what we do not want it to do, but also credibility that we do not punish it if it does not do what we did not want it to do. This is then shown against the history of deterrence against North Korea. Deterrence there did not fail as a result of failure to convince North Korea that it will be punished if it develops nuclear weapons. It failed because deterrence did not manage to persuade North Korea that it will not be punished if it did not develop nuclear weapons.

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Why is it important?

The finding that deterrence often fails because the target is not convinced that it does not get punished if it does not do what the deterrer does not want it to do, has tremendous practical value. Threatening military exercises next to North Korea may not help pacify North Korea simply, because North Korea already knows that it will be punished if it did not behave. Provocative exercises may be counter-productive simply because they may convince North Korea that the West is planning for an unprovoked attack on North Korea. Thus it gives a motive of demonstrating North Korea's own military capabilities in a provocative manner, instead of deterring such provocations.

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